EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY IN UNANIMITY GAMES WITH CHEAP TALK

被引：30

作者：

WARNERYD, K

机构：

[1] Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University, Fairfax

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1991年 / 36卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(91)90201-U

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper studies a class of games of perfectly coinciding interests with a preplay communication stage added. If messages are costless (cheap talk), there are inefficient Nash equilibria even under communication. However, I show that only strategies that induce efficient outcomes are evolutionary stable. © 1991.

引用

页码：375 / 378

页数：4

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