EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY IN UNANIMITY GAMES WITH CHEAP TALK

被引：30
|
作者：
WARNERYD, K
机构：
[1] Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University, Fairfax
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1991年 / 36卷 / 04期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0165-1765(91)90201-U
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper studies a class of games of perfectly coinciding interests with a preplay communication stage added. If messages are costless (cheap talk), there are inefficient Nash equilibria even under communication. However, I show that only strategies that induce efficient outcomes are evolutionary stable. © 1991.
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页码：375 / 378
页数：4
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