IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE RULES - SOME GENERAL RESULTS ON INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY

被引：415
|
作者：
DASGUPTA, P
HAMMOND, P
MASKIN, E
机构：
[1] UNIV ESSEX,COLCHESTER CO4 3SQ,ESSEX,ENGLAND
[2] MIT,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139
来源：
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 1979年 / 46卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/2297045
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：185 / 216
页数：32
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