LIMITATIONS OF DOMINANCE AND FORWARD INDUCTION - EXPERIMENTAL-EVIDENCE

被引：18
|
作者：
BRANDTS, J [1 ]
HOLT, CA [1 ]
机构：
[1] UNIV VIRGINIA,CHARLOTTESVILLE,VA 22901
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1995年 / 49卷 / 04期
关键词：
FORWARD INDUCTION; NASH EQUILIBRIUM REFINEMENTS; EXPERIMENTAL GAMES;
D O I：
10.1016/0165-1765(95)00706-L
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Forward induction implies that forgoing a sure 'outside option' can alter after subsequent beliefs and behavior. Our laboratory results do not support forward induction, except in a very simple game where it is equivalent to the elimination of dominated strategies.
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页码：391 / 395
页数：5
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