EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN EXPERIMENTAL GAMES WITH RECOMMENDED PLAY

被引：36
|
作者：
BRANDTS, J [1 ]
MACLEOD, WB [1 ]
机构：
[1] UNIV MONTREAL,CTR RECH & DEV ECON,MONTREAL,PQ H3C 3J7,CANADA
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1995年 / 11卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1006/game.1995.1040
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper presents the results of experimental games with multiple Nash equilibria in which subjects were given suggestions for their play. This procedure allows for a direct test of the self-enforcement condition implicit in the Nash equilibrium concept. The results show that perfectness has cutting power in simple single-stage games. Also, off-equilibrium payoffs influence subjects' behavior. For two-stage games we find support for the position that subgame perfect equilibria are strategically stable and weak support for the concept of forward induction. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: 215. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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页码：36 / 63
页数：28
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