MULTIPLE-TASK AND MULTIPLE-AGENT MODELS - INCENTIVE CONTRACTS AND AN APPLICATION TO POINT POLLUTION-CONTROL

被引:2
|
作者
KARMANN, A [1 ]
机构
[1] TECH UNIV DRESDEN,D-01062 DRESDEN,GERMANY
关键词
PRINCIPAL-AGENT; MULTI-AGENTS; LINEAR INCENTIVE SCHEMES; FIRM ORGANIZATION; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY;
D O I
10.1007/BF02031727
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Two types of linear-quadratic principal-agent models will be considered: one in which a single agent has to perform several tasks and one in which several agents have to perform a certain task. For both models, we derive optimal contractual principal-agent relations. It turns out that under certain conditions (concerning risk-aversion and the correlation of the agents' outcome) the multiple-agent problem reduces to a multiple-task one-agent problem. Our results will be discussed within the framework of (multiple-) point pollution to which, in addition, also the results of the standard principal-agent model will be applied.
引用
收藏
页码:57 / 78
页数:22
相关论文
共 47 条