EVOLUTION AND THE COMPLEXITY OF FINITE AUTOMATA

被引:1
|
作者
Kilani, Moez [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Sousse, Dept Quantitat Econ, ISG, Rue Abdelaziz el Behi, Sousse 4000, Tunisia
关键词
Finite automata; complexity of the strategy; cooperation; evolution;
D O I
10.1142/S0219198907001692
中图分类号
O1 [数学];
学科分类号
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要
Prisoner's dilemma played by finite automata is reviewed again using a slightly modified measure of complexity. At a first step, an equilibrium with a large number of possible outcomes is shown to hold. At a second stage, we consider a game of repeated interaction, and show that on (limit) equilibrium only cooperative actions are played. We conclude that cooperation is the result of a (complex) long interaction.
引用
收藏
页码:731 / 743
页数:13
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