ON THE OPTIMALITY OF TREASURY-BILL AUCTIONS

被引：3
|
作者：
MENEZES, FM
机构：
[1] Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Commerce, The Australian National University, Canberra
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1995年 / 49卷 / 03期
关键词：
TREASURY BILL AUCTIONS; REVENUE MAXIMIZATION;
D O I：
10.1016/0165-1765(95)00676-7
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In this paper we examine a stylized version of Treasury Bill auctions. We show that if bidders are uncertain about the total amount being sold, as in actual Tbill auctions, there is a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium the seller's revenue is maximized.
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页码：273 / 279
页数：7
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