The United States has reassessed its military-security needs and interests in Northeast Asia in the post-Cold War era in view of the changing international security environment. In this article, the author makes four major arguments: (1) the US has and will continue to be a protector of the ROK in the 1990s; (2) US Forces in Korea can play a new role in arms control and peace negotiations with the DPRK and the US troop reduction and withdrawal issue could be used as a political bargaining chip in arms control negotiations with Pyongyang; (3) both the ROK and US governments can make joint efforts to create favorable conditions for implementing the US-DPRK nuclear agreement, the ROK-DPRK Basic agreement, and the inter-Korean joint nonnuclear declaration for the Korean peninsula; and (4) the security dilemma on the Korean peninsula could be resolved by realizing the ''Koreanization of security,'' through inter-Korean military cooperation. The US is firmly committed to the defense of the ROK. US military-security objectives on the Korean peninsula in the 1990s are: (1) to deter DPRK aggression or defeat it if-deterrence fails; (2) to reduce political-military tensions on the Korean peninsula by encouraging inter-Korean talks and the institution of a confidence building measures regime; and (3) to change the role of US Forces in Korea from a leading to a supporting role, including some force reductions. The issue of the DPRK's nuclear arms development program is a key obstacle to the peace process on the Korean peninsula and to the implementation process of the timetable for US troop reduction. The agreed framework between the US and the DPRK has a 10-year timetable for steps by each side that would end with the complete dismantling of Pyongyang's nuclear program by 2003. If the agreement is successfully implemented, the agreed framework would have profound effects on the future security relations between the US and the ROK. First of all, the three-stage US force reduction and withdrawal plan will be under way. Second, the DPRK will continue demanding a US-DPRK peace treaty to replace the Korean Armistice Agreement of 1953. Does the DPRK really want US troop withdrawal from Korea? Pyongyang has officially and consistently maintained that the presence of US troops in Korea is the basic obstacle to inter-Korean dialogue and Korean reunification. Pyongyang's demand for US troop withdrawal has not;been changed in principle. However, there have been significant signals of change in the DPRK's perception of US troops in Korea in recent years. It should be pointed out that Pyongyang also agreed on a phased withdrawal of US forces from Korea. The DPRK wants a step-by-step, but complete withdrawal of US forces for achieving national unification. In sum, since it is not unreasonable to conclude that Kim Jong Il's interests would be best served by the presence of US troops stationed in the ROK, he may not really want the complete withdrawal of the US forces in the near future. In the final analysis, what are the future prospects of US-ROK military-security relations toward the 21st century? The US commitment to the security of the ROK will remain firm. Some gradual modifications in US security policy toward the Korean peninsula will be expected if the DPRK sincerely implements the nuclear agreement. These include: (1) the new US defense plan with deep cuts in US defense spending will have a profound effect on US-Korean security relations. It is expected that there will be an acceleration of US troop reduction in Korea; (2) the ROK will share more defense costs of maintaining US Forces in Korea; and (3) US-DPRK political-diplomatic relations will be improved and normalized.
