Fee versus royalty licensing in a Coumot duopoly model with a commitment of no production

被引：0
|
作者：
Colombo, Stefano [1 ]
Filippini, Luigi [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Cattolica Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy
来源：
ECONOMICS BULLETIN | 2013年 / 33卷 / 03期
关键词：
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
A typical result in patent licensing literature is that an insider patent-holder prefers licensing through royalties instead than through a fixed fee. However, when a commitment of no production is possible for the patent-holder, the result is reverted.
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页码：2122 / 2128
页数：7
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