A moral dilemma argument against clinical trials of incentives for kidney donation

被引:1
|
作者
Prasad, G. V. Ramesh [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Toronto, St Michaels Hosp, Div Nephrol, 61 Queen St East,9th Floor, Toronto, ON M5C 2T2, Canada
来源
关键词
Autonomy; Beneficence; Compensation; Dilemma; Organ shortage; Poverty; Transplantation;
D O I
10.1186/s13737-015-0025-9
中图分类号
R3 [基础医学]; R4 [临床医学];
学科分类号
1001 ; 1002 ; 100602 ;
摘要
Commercial transplant tourism results in significant harm to both kidney donors and recipients. However, proponents of incentives for kidney donation assert that proper oversight of the process prevents these harms and also that transplant numbers can be safely increased so that the moral burden of poor end-stage kidney disease outcomes can be alleviated. In a moral dilemma analysis, the principle of preventing donor harm can be dissociated from the principles of providing benefits to the recipient and to society. It is plausible that an incentivized donor is fundamentally different from an uncompensated donor. Incentivized donors can experience harms unrelated to lack of regulation because their characteristics are determined by the incentive superimposed upon a poverty circumstance. Moreover, creating a system of incentivized donation without established national registries for capturing all long-term donor outcomes would be morally inconsistent, since without prior demonstration that donor outcomes are not income or wealth-dependent, a population of incentivized donors cannot be morally created in a clinical trial. Socioeconomic factors adversely affect outcome in other surgical populations, and interventions on income or wealth in these populations have not been studied. Coercion will be increased in families not affected by kidney disease, where knowledge of a new income source and not of a potential recipient is the incentive. In the case of elective surgery such as kidney donation, donor non-maleficence trumps donor autonomy, recipient beneficence, and beneficence to society when there is a conflict among these principles. Yet, we are still faced with the total moral burden of end-stage kidney disease, which belongs to the society that cannot provide enough donor kidneys. Acting according to one arm of the dilemma to prevent donor harm does not erase obligations towards the other, to provide recipient benefit. To resolve the moral burden, as moral agents, we must rearrange our institutions by increasing available donor organs from other sources. The shortage of donor kidneys creates a moral burden for society, but incentives for donation will only increase the total moral burden of end-stage kidney disease.
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页数:4
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