The Moral Agency Argument Against Moral Bioenhancement

被引:6
|
作者
Reichlin, Massimo [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ San Raffaele, Fac Philosophy, Via Olgettina 58, I-20132 Milan, Italy
来源
关键词
Moral bioenhancement; Freedom; Moral agency; Moral identity; Cognitive enhancement; ENHANCEMENT; FREEDOM;
D O I
10.1007/s11245-017-9471-y
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
It is often contended that certain enhancement technologies are acceptable, because they simply update traditional ways of pursuing the improvement of human capacities. This is not true with reference to moral bioenhancement, because of the radical difference between traditional and biotechnological ways of producing moral progress. These latter risk having serious negative effects on our moral agency, by causing a substantial loss of freedom and capacity of authentic moral behaviour, by affecting our moral identity and by imposing a standard conception of moral personality.
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页码:53 / 62
页数:10
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