DYNAMIC PUBLIC-GOODS PROVISION WITH COALITIONAL MANIPULATION

被引：0

作者：

CHAKRAVORTI, B

机构：

[1] Economics Research Group, Information Sciences and Technologies Research Laboratory, Bellcore, Morristown, NJ 07960, 2Q-382

来源：

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS | 1995年 / 56卷 / 01期

关键词：

PLANNING PROCEDURE; DYNAMIC EQUITY; CONVERGENCE; IMPLEMENTATION; SUBGAME-PERFECT COALITION-PROOF EQUILIBRIUM;

D O I：

10.1016/0047-2727(93)01410-C

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study dynamic procedures for the provision of an efficient level of a public good with time-dependent surplus distribution. In general, such procedures are prone to manipulation via pre-play communication among coalitions of agents. We begin with a generalization of Truchon's (Econometrica, 1984, 52, 1179-1190) elegant non-myopic MDP procedure and provide a new procedure that exhibits finite, monotone convergence to Pareto-efficiency in Subgame-Perfect Coalition-proof equilibrium. This procedure also implements any 'regular' surplus distribution rule that is dependent on the public good level. The solution concept of Subgame-Perfect Coalition-proof equilibrium is also new. It is an extension of the semistability characterizations of Coalition-proof equilibrium for infinite-strategy games due to Kahn and Mookherjee (Games and Economic Behavior, 1992, 4, 101-121). The coalition-proofing device given is more generally applicable.

引用

页码：143 / 161

页数：19

共 50 条

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