STABLE OUTCOMES IN SEQUENTIAL INFORMATION TRADING - AN APPLICATION OF THE BARGAINING SET

被引：0
|
作者：
MUTO, S [1 ]
NAKAYAMA, M [1 ]
机构：
[1] HOSEI UNIV, FAC ECON, MACHIDA, TOKYO 19402, JAPAN
来源：
LECTURE NOTES IN ECONOMICS AND MATHEMATICAL SYSTEMS | 1992年 / 389卷
关键词：
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Information is freely replicable; and thus, resales of replicas are unavoidable unless they are legally prohibited. In this paper, we first present a model of sequential information trading where information is initially owned by a sole player and resales are freely allowed. The model explicitly takes into account players' negotiation on profit sharing in the initial sale as well as in resales which may ensue. Then, using the bargaining set modified appropriately for our model, we analyze how players share information and associated profits.
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页码：409 / 441
页数：33
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