The calculus of corruption: a paradox of "strong' corruption amidst "strong' systems and institutions in developing administrative systems

被引:13
|
作者
Yeboah-Assiamah, Emmanuel [1 ]
Alesu-Dordzi, Samuel [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Stellenbosch, Sch Publ Leadership, Stellenbosch Campus,Private Bag X1, ZA-7602 Matieland, South Africa
[2] Ghana Sch Law, Accra, Greater Accra, Ghana
关键词
D O I
10.1002/pa.1576
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; D035 [国家行政管理]; D523 [行政管理]; D63 [国家行政管理];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;
摘要
Without the right political will to battle corruption, systems and institutions are put in place and tend to be facade and window dressing. Ghana, especially, in the new millennium has seen the proliferation of various institutions ostensibly to curb the phenomenon of corruption, yet its impact has only been marginal. This study adopts two models of corruption to critically assess the institutional development of Ghana since the Fourth Republican Dispensation and how these institutions have impacted the fight against corruption. The study adopts mainly secondary data and resources from the 1992 Republican Constitution, Acts of Parliaments and Legislative Instruments relevant corruption combat. An analysis of the corruption perception index of Ghana from 2000 to 2014 and other data portrays poor performance. What accounts for this phenomenon? Are there really demons who obstruct the spirit and letter of the institutions? Are the systems weak or the human elements (demons) rather stronger in adapting and outsmarting the institutions? Copyright (c) 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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页码:203 / 216
页数:14
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