This paper investigates the simultaneous-move games in a mixed duopoly where firms are maximizers of either profits or relative profits. Contrary to previous results, if each firm has mixed motives about payoff in a simultaneous-move game, a private firm monopolizes whereas the public firm produces nothing.
机构:
MIT, Dept Math, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
FCT UNL, Dept Matemat, P-2829516 Quinta Da Torre, Caparica, Portugal
FCT UNL, CMA, P-2829516 Quinta Da Torre, Caparica, PortugalMIT, Dept Math, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
机构:
Polytech Inst Porto, Appl Management Res Unit UNIAG, ESEIG IPP, Rua D Sancho 1, P-4480876 Vila Do Conde, PortugalPolytech Inst Porto, Appl Management Res Unit UNIAG, ESEIG IPP, Rua D Sancho 1, P-4480876 Vila Do Conde, Portugal
Ferreira, Fernanda A.
Ferreira, Flavio
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机构:
Polytech Inst Porto, Appl Management Res Unit UNIAG, ESEIG IPP, Rua D Sancho 1, P-4480876 Vila Do Conde, PortugalPolytech Inst Porto, Appl Management Res Unit UNIAG, ESEIG IPP, Rua D Sancho 1, P-4480876 Vila Do Conde, Portugal
Ferreira, Flavio
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON NUMERICAL ANALYSIS AND APPLIED MATHEMATICS 2015 (ICNAAM-2015),
2016,
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