HUMAN RIGHTS, MORAL OBLIGATIONS, AND DIVINE COMMANDS

The principal question which I set out to answer is whether, since moral rights and obligations stand or fall together, the latter can stand, that is, whether they are real and inescapable. The argument initially unfolds as a running comment on the development of Bernard Williams's moral thinking. The reason is that his thought nicely exemplifies an interesting connection between a particular religious and moral scepticism. A first conclusion is that a morality of real, inescapable and - for the agent-sometimes costly obligations and their correlative rights, while being at home in a theistic metaphysic, fits in badly with metaphysical, atheistic naturalism. The second conclusion is that Christine Korsgaard's impressive ethical project, which is neutral towards theism and atheism, fails to give a satisfying account of such obligations. My final claim is that a theistic account in terms of a strong divine command theory succeeds where non-theistic and atheistic accounts seem to founder.