PURE STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA IN A CLASS OF SYSTEMS DEFENSE GAMES

This paper analyzes a class of systems defense games. Section 1 provides an overview. Section 2 reviews the assumptions used to specify a class of system defense games in Shubik and Weber (1978, 1981) and Shubik (1982). This is followed by a review of the additive games considered in Shubik and Weber (1981) - and the notion of comparable amounts of strategic resources used in that paper. Section 3 generalizes two of the features of additive system defense games with comparable resources. Section 4 states the final assumptions that are being made, and discusses the nature of the resulting class of systems defense games. The central result in the paper is in Section 5. The theorem specifically identifies an implicit objective function that is maximized by the equilibrium strategies. In Section 6, the theorem is used to also obtain an equilibrium existence result and identify conditions where there is a unique equilibrium.