On pure-strategy equilibria in games with correlated information

被引：7
|
作者：
Khan, M. Ali [1 ]
Zhang, Yongchao [2 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Johns Hopkins Univ, Dept Econ, Baltimore, MD 21218 USA
[2] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Econ, 777 Guoding Rd, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
[3] Minist Educ, Key Lab Math Econ SHUFE, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2018年 / 111卷
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Bayesian games; Pure-strategy equilibrium; Correlated information; Atomless independent supplement; Radner-Rosenthal (RR) example; PRIVATE INFORMATION; BAYESIAN GAMES; PURIFICATION; EXISTENCE;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.006
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper rehabilitates a program initiated in Aumann (1974) by contributing a result to the theory of finite-player Bayesian games in environments that explicitly include correlated information. An equivalence theorem offers conditions under which the set of mixed-strategy equilibrium payoffs in a classical finite-action game of complete information coincides with the set of objective pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) expected payoffs in an affiliated Bayesian game with type-independent payoffs. This result is motivated for a non-specialist reader by several examples. An Appendix devoted to an intuitive discussion of the so-called 'Lebesgue extension' is added to make the paper self-contained. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码：289 / 304
页数：16
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