On pure-strategy equilibria in games with correlated information

被引：7

作者：

Khan, M. Ali ^{[1
]}

Zhang, Yongchao ^{[2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Johns Hopkins Univ, Dept Econ, Baltimore, MD 21218 USA

[2] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Econ, 777 Guoding Rd, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China

[3] Minist Educ, Key Lab Math Econ SHUFE, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2018年 / 111卷

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Bayesian games; Pure-strategy equilibrium; Correlated information; Atomless independent supplement; Radner-Rosenthal (RR) example; PRIVATE INFORMATION; BAYESIAN GAMES; PURIFICATION; EXISTENCE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.006

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper rehabilitates a program initiated in Aumann (1974) by contributing a result to the theory of finite-player Bayesian games in environments that explicitly include correlated information. An equivalence theorem offers conditions under which the set of mixed-strategy equilibrium payoffs in a classical finite-action game of complete information coincides with the set of objective pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) expected payoffs in an affiliated Bayesian game with type-independent payoffs. This result is motivated for a non-specialist reader by several examples. An Appendix devoted to an intuitive discussion of the so-called 'Lebesgue extension' is added to make the paper self-contained. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：289 / 304

页数：16

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