PRODUCT WARRANTIES AND DOUBLE MORAL HAZARD

被引：221
|
作者：
COOPER, R
ROSS, TW
机构：
[1] UNIV IOWA,IOWA CITY,IA 52242
[2] CARLETON UNIV,OTTAWA K1S 5B6,ONTARIO,CANADA
来源：
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1985年 / 16卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/2555592
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：103 / 113
页数：11
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