Is Freedom of Conscience Superior to Freedom of Religion?

被引:4
|
作者
Ahdar, Rex [1 ,2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Otago, Fac Law, Dunedin, New Zealand
[2] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Fac Law, Jerusalem, Israel
[3] Univ Notre Dame Australia, Sch Law, Sydney, NSW, Australia
关键词
D O I
10.1093/ojlr/rwy006
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
The notion that religious freedom claims might be recast as claims for the protection of liberty of conscience appeals to many claimants. Their chances of success appear brighter if the appeal is made to the seemingly more neutral and universal idea of conscience. This article examines this argument. I conclude that the initial promise of liberty of conscience belies certain significant weaknesses. Refashioning claims for the unhindered manifestation of one's deepest beliefs runs into some serious obstacles. The root cause may be the transmogrification of conscience into an individualized expression of the person's moral compass, a truncated conception severed from earlier notions that tied conscience to synderesis, the appreciation of (and obligation to respond to) the moral law. When conscience is envisioned-as it is today-as the mere exercise of one's sincere autonomous will, the weight accorded it in the usual balancing of liberty against pressing societal interests will seldom appear enough to win the day. Liberty of conscience is a powerful supplement to religious freedom, but too weak a reed to stand alone.
引用
收藏
页码:124 / 142
页数:19
相关论文
共 50 条