Exemptions to the Law, Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Conscience in Postsecular Societies

In this paper, I argue that the diversity characteristic of postsecular societies challenges the special legal status of religion and confronts liberal egalitarians to a dilemma. I first argue that there are no good reasons to single out religion for special legal treatment and to make conventional religious convictions the only legitimate candidates for exemptions to neutral laws of general applicability. Then, I show that once they acknowledge this point, liberal egalitarians find themselves at a crossroad, contemplating two seemingly unattractive options. On the one hand, they can expand practices of religious exemptions so as to offer similar legal protection to non-religious commitments. However, many think that this runs the risk of an uncontrollable proliferation of exemptions. On the other hand, liberals can adopt a deflationist strategy and deny that the protection of freedom requires granting exemptions to the law, for both religious and secular commitments, thereby abandoning practices of exemptions which are sometimes needed to treat individuals with equal concern. I show that this dilemma is central in the recent accounts of religious freedom proposed by Ronald Dworkin and Brian Leiter, who both adopt the deflationist approach. I argue that fears related to the proliferation of exemptions are exaggerated and that citizens of postsecular societies are in no rush to turn their back to the expansionist approach to exemptionism.