ELICITING TRADERS KNOWLEDGE IN A FRICTIONLESS ASSET MARKET

被引：0
|
作者：
GREEN, EJ [1 ]
机构：
[1] FED RESERVE BANK MINNEAPOLIS, MINNEAPOLIS, MN USA
来源：
LECTURE NOTES IN ECONOMICS AND MATHEMATICAL SYSTEMS | 1992年 / 389卷
关键词：
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Intuitively, a patient trader should be able to make his trading partners compete to reveal whatever information is relevant to their transactions with him. This possibility is examined in the context of a model resembling that of Gale (1986). The main result is that, under assumptions having to do with asset structure and spanning, incentive-compatible elicitation of trading partners' knowledge is feasible.
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页码：332 / 355
页数：24
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