THE ROLE OF RISK PREFERENCES IN BARGAINING WHEN ACCEPTANCE OF A PROPOSAL REQUIRES LESS THAN UNANIMOUS APPROVAL

被引：27

作者：

HARRINGTON, JE

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, 21218, Maryland

来源：

JOURNAL OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY | 1990年 / 3卷 / 02期

关键词：

alternating offer model; bargaining; nonunanimity voting rules; risk aversion;

D O I：

10.1007/BF00056369

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

The role of risk preferences in determining the outcome to bargaining is examined for the case in which acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval. Using an n-agent extension of the Ståhl-Rubinstein alternating offer model, we find that risk preferences play a fundamentally different role when bargaining is settled using a nonunanimity voting rule. Risk preferences determine not only an agent's reservation price but also the likelihood that he is made part of the winning coalition. An implication of this analysis is that when the preferences of the agents are not too diverse, it is advantageous for an agent to be relatively risk-averse. © 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

引用

页码：135 / 154

页数：20