REPRESENTATIVE VERSUS DIRECT DEMOCRACY - A TEST OF ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY IN LOCAL-GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES

被引：4
|
作者：
DELLER, SC
CHICOINE, DL
机构：
[1] UNIV ILLINOIS,DEPT AGR ECON,URBANA,IL 61801
[2] UNIV ILLINOIS,INST GOVT & PUBL AFFAIRS,URBANA,IL 61801
来源：
PUBLIC FINANCE QUARTERLY | 1993年 / 21卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1177/109114219302100105
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
The influence of government structure on the efficient allocation of public resources is examined. A test developed by Brueckner is used to examine differences in the allocative efficiency of representative versus direct democracy forms of local government. The empirical results suggest that the form of government has no influence on the level of allocative efficiency.
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页码：100 / 114
页数：15
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