EVIDENCE ON ADVERSE SELECTION - EQUILIBRIUM SIGNALING AND CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION IN THE INSURANCE MARKET

被引:123
|
作者
PUELZ, R [1 ]
SNOW, A [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV GEORGIA, ATHENS, GA 30602 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1086/261930
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The configuration of equilibrium in the market for automobile collision insurance is examined empirically by representing the premium-deductible menu and the demand function as a standard hedonic system. Using contractual data from a representative insurer, we estimate a reduced-form hedonic premium equation and the inverse of the marginal bid equation for insurance coverage. The data reveal an equilibrium with adverse selection and market signaling but lead us to reject the hypothesis that high risks receive contracts subsidized by low risks.
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页码:236 / 257
页数:22
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