The configuration of equilibrium in the market for automobile collision insurance is examined empirically by representing the premium-deductible menu and the demand function as a standard hedonic system. Using contractual data from a representative insurer, we estimate a reduced-form hedonic premium equation and the inverse of the marginal bid equation for insurance coverage. The data reveal an equilibrium with adverse selection and market signaling but lead us to reject the hypothesis that high risks receive contracts subsidized by low risks.
机构:
Singapore Management Univ, Lee Kong Chian Sch Business, Singapore 178899, SingaporeSingapore Management Univ, Lee Kong Chian Sch Business, Singapore 178899, Singapore
She, Zhaowei
Ayer, Turgay
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机构:
Georgia Inst Technol, H Milton Stewart Sch Ind & Syst Engn, Atlanta, GA 30332 USASingapore Management Univ, Lee Kong Chian Sch Business, Singapore 178899, Singapore
Ayer, Turgay
Gokpinar, Bilal
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机构:
UCL, UCL Sch Management, London E14 5AA, EnglandSingapore Management Univ, Lee Kong Chian Sch Business, Singapore 178899, Singapore
Gokpinar, Bilal
Hughesd, Danny R.
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机构:
Arizona State Univ, Coll Hlth Solut, Phoenix, AZ 85004 USASingapore Management Univ, Lee Kong Chian Sch Business, Singapore 178899, Singapore
机构:
Univ Fed Rio de Janeiro, Inst Econ, BR-22290240 Rio De Janeiro, BrazilUniv Fed Rio de Janeiro, Inst Econ, BR-22290240 Rio De Janeiro, Brazil
Resende, Marcelo
Zeidan, Rodrigo
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UNIGRANRIO, Escola Ciencias Sociais Aplicadas, BR-20021180 Rio De Janeiro, BrazilUniv Fed Rio de Janeiro, Inst Econ, BR-22290240 Rio De Janeiro, Brazil
Zeidan, Rodrigo
[J].
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS,
2010,
11
(04):
: 413
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418