New roads to international environmental agreements: the case of global warming

被引:7
|
作者
Eyckmans, Johan [1 ,2 ]
Finus, Michael [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Europese Hogesch Brussel, EHSAL, Stormstr 2, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium
[2] Katholieke Univ Leuven, Centrum Voor Econom Studien, Leuven, Belgium
[3] Univ Hagen, Dept Econ, D-58084 Hagen, Germany
[4] Natl Univ Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
关键词
Design of climate treaty protocol; Coalition formation; Noncooperative game theory;
D O I
10.1007/BF03353948
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We relax the single agreement and open membership assumptions that are implicit in the concept of internal and external stability, which has been widely used to analyze the formation of international environmental agreements (lEAs). By means of numerical simulations we investigate the impact of these changes using a dataset derived from an integrated assessment model of climate change. Our simulations show that multiple agreements are superior to a single agreement and exclusive membership is superior to open membership in ecological and welfare terms. Moreover, we demonstrate the importance of transfers for successful treaty making and we derive recommendations for the design of future lEAs.
引用
收藏
页码:391 / 414
页数:24
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