This article examines Australia's strategic policy during the 1999 East Timor crisis. Written as a stand-alone piece, it is in some ways a broad counter-point to the essay by Professor Hugh White in the Autumn 2008 issue of Security Challenges. 1 The author, who was Principal Analyst (East Timor) for the Australian Intelligence Corps in 1998 and 1999, argues that the Australian government was not ambivalent about a peacekeeping force; rather, it worked assiduously to prevent such a force. It demonstrates the need for strategic actors to incorporate the rough-and-tumble of domestic politics and public opinion into their sometimes bureaucratic, anaemic calculations.
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Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USAUniv Penn, Wharton Sch, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
Levinthal, Daniel A.
Pham, Dong Nghi
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ESSEC Business Sch, F-95021 Cergy Pontoise, France
Ramon Llull Univ, ESADE Business Sch, Barcelona 08022, SpainUniv Penn, Wharton Sch, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA