Political competition and bilateral direct investments

被引：0
|
作者：
Yu Miaojie [1 ]
机构：
[1] Peking Univ, China Ctr Econ Res, Beijing 100872, Peoples R China
来源：
FRONTIERS OF ECONOMICS IN CHINA | 2007年 / 2卷 / 02期
关键词：
tariffs; political contributions; bilateral direct investments;
D O I：
10.1007/s11459-007-0014-0
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper investigates a basic question about the international political economy-why is international trade not free? To answer this question, we modified Grossman and Helpman (1994) by considering that interest lobbies make political contributions to both the incumbent government and the political challenger in order to influence the incumbent government's choice of trade policy. By examining the contribution schedules under a framework of bilateral direct investments, we find that the modified Ramsey rule still holds under our setting.
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页码：250 / 274
页数：25
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