Tax avoidance and firm value: evidence from China

被引:48
|
作者
Chen, Xudong [1 ]
Hu, Na [1 ]
Wang, Xue [1 ]
Tang, Xiaofei [2 ]
机构
[1] Southwestern Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Accounting, Chengdu, Sichuan, Peoples R China
[2] Southwestern Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Business Management, Chengdu, Sichuan, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Tax avoidance; Firm value; Information transparency;
D O I
10.1108/NBRI-10-2013-0037
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Purpose - The purpose of this study is to examine whether corporate tax avoidance behavior increases firm value in Chinese context. A large number of studies conduct their designs on the consumption that tax avoidance represents wealth transfer from government to enterprises and therefore enhances firm value. This study argues that, contrast to developed countries, tax avoidance does not necessarily add value to opaque Chinese firms relative to transparent counterparts due to higher agency costs. Design/methodology/approach - Using a large sample of Chinese listed-firms data for the period 2001-2009 and fixed effects regression model, this study examines the relation between tax avoidance and firm value. A series of robustness checks are conducted to alleviate the concern of endogeneity. Findings - The authors find that tax avoidance behavior increases agency costs and reduces firm value. The authors further find that information transparency interacts with corporate tax avoidance, moderating the relation between tax avoidance and firm value. Investors in China react negatively to corporate tax avoidance behavior, but this negative reaction could be mitigated by information transparency. The results are robust to a series of alternative treatments, including varied measures, first-order differential approach and 2SLS. Originality/value - The results suggest that tax avoidance does not necessarily increase firm value, part of gains are encroached by self-serving managers. Moreover, investors in China downplay the significance of tax avoidance, although corporate information transparency could soften their negative tone.
引用
收藏
页码:25 / 42
页数:18
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