Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies

被引：0
|
作者：
François Maniquet
Yves Sprumont
机构：
[1] Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique and Facultés Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix,
[2] 8 Rempart de la Vierge,undefined
[3] B-5000 Namur,undefined
[4] BELGIUM (e-mail: francois.maniquet@fundp.ac.be) ,undefined
[5] Département de Sciences Economiques and Centre de Recherche et Développement en Economique,undefined
[6] Université de Montréal,undefined
[7] 3150,undefined
[8] rue Jean-Brillant,undefined
[9] bureau C-6024 C.P. 6128,undefined
[10] Succ. Centre-Ville Montréal (PQ) H3C 3J7,undefined
[11] CANADA ,undefined
来源：
Economic Theory | 1999年 / 14卷
关键词：
Keywords and Phrases: Strategy-proofness, Efficiency, Linear production set.; JEL Classification Numbers: C78, D71.;
D O I：
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中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function. This function is also the unique member of the latter class which satisfies uniform treatment of uniforms.
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页码：583 / 595
页数：12
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