An evolutionary analysis of low-carbon technology investment strategies based on the manufacturer-supplier matching game under government regulations

Developing a low-carbon economy is the only way for countries to achieve sustainable development. Carbon emission reduction policies and low-carbon technology (LCT) innovation play key roles in developing low-carbon economy. Under government reward and punishment regulations, based on the bilateral matching and evolutionary theories, this paper constructs an evolution model consisting of a manufacturer investing LCT and a supplier offering LCT to analyze multi-phase LCT investment strategies. Firstly, the profit optimization model of a green supply chain is constructed from the perspectives of centralized-matching (CM), decentralized-matching (DM), and mismatching (MM), and the spatial information internal evolution law of multi-phase LCT investment is described by the Markov chain. Then, a bilateral matching algorithm is proposed to solve the equilibrium solutions, and the evolution process of the three modes is analyzed by numerical simulation. Finally, based on the product green degree, we analyze the impact of subsidies and taxes on investment-production decisions. Analytical results show that the matching mechanism proposed in this paper can help supply chain firms to obtain stable matching and has a significant effect on the realization of “triple wins” of society, economy, and environment. The investment utility of CM is higher than that of DM and MM. Manufacturers are inclined to adopt LCT, and the investment level tends to be stable over time. Government reward and punishment regulations are helpful to motivate supply chain firms to invest in LCT, and the synergistic effect of subsidies and taxes is better than that of a single policy.