Analysis of low-carbon technology transfer strategies based on a quadrilateral evolutionary game

Promoting low-carbon technology transfer is crucial for reducing global greenhouse gas emissions, combating climate change, and fostering sustainable development. Based on the "efficient market" and "active government" concepts, a "government-intermediary-receiver-sender" game model was constructed, identifying evolutionary stable strategies and key factors affecting strategy selection. It was found that (1) receiver and sender needs and government policy incentives increase intermediaries' willingness to participate, reducing input costs and shifting government support from incentives to compensatory regulations; (2) optimal strategies emerge when incentives for low-carbon technology senders, receivers, and intermediaries, and penalties for serious defaults by senders and receivers exceed a threshold, fostering high participation willingness and leading to government implementation of compensatory regulations; (3) differentiated penalties are necessary to avoid a senderreceiver prisoner's dilemma but only ensure one side's willingness to participate, while government incentivebased regulation can overcome negative constraints and promote active participation from both sender and receiver. Compensatory regulations encourage sustained technology transfer costs and reduce incentive costs, with optimization focusing on lowering government publicity costs and increasing economic benefits for intermediaries.