Minimal covering set solutions

被引：0
|
作者：
Michele Lombardi
机构：
[1] University of Warwick,Department of Economics
来源：
Social Choice and Welfare | 2009年 / 32卷
关键词：
Choice Function; Social Choice Function; Condorcet Winner; Social Choice Theory; Strict Partial Order;
D O I：
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中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We study necessary and sufficient conditions for a multi-valued solution S to be rationalized in the following sense: there exists a complete asymmetric relation T (a tournament) such that, for each feasible (finite) set, the solution set of S coincides with the minimal covering set of T restricted to that feasible set. Our characterization result relies only on properties relating S across feasible choice sets.
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页码：687 / 695
页数：8
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