Winners don’t punish

被引:0
|
作者
Anna Dreber
David G. Rand
Drew Fudenberg
Martin A. Nowak
机构
[1] Program for Evolutionary Dynamics,Department of Mathematics
[2] ,Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology
[3] Department of Systems Biology,Department of Economics
[4] ,undefined
[5] Department of Economics,undefined
[6] ,undefined
[7] and,undefined
[8] Harvard University,undefined
[9] Cambridge,undefined
[10] Massachusetts 02138,undefined
[11] USA,undefined
[12] Stockholm School of Economics,undefined
来源
Nature | 2008年 / 452卷
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摘要
Many theories have been offered to explain the evolution of cooperation in humans. One proposal is that costly punishment can promote cooperation. Everyone benefits on average, the theory goes, despite the cost to those doing the punishing. But most of our interactions are repeated, and in such cases punishment can lead to retaliation. Using a variant of the 'Prisoner's Dilemma' game, Dreber et al. find that punishment increases the frequency of cooperation, but not the average payoff. Costly punishments confer no overall advantage to the group. And players who end up with the highest total payoff ('winners') tend not to use punishment, while those with the lowest payoff ('losers') punish most frequently. It seems that costly punishment may not have evolved to promote cooperation, but for some other purpose.
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页码:348 / 351
页数:3
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