Lowest revenue limit-based truthful auction mechanism for cloud resource allocation

An auction mechanism is an effective way to allocate resources through market behavior. However, in existing studies, most auction mechanisms are designed based on the maximization of social welfare, and there are few studies on potential revenue. Based on cloud computing resource allocation, this paper studies an auction mechanism with revenue limits under single-dimensional and multidimensional resource allocation. That is, the resource provider proposes the lowest revenue limit B. The mechanism aims to maximize the total social welfare while conforming to the lowest revenue limit of the provider. Specifically, we design a new price-raising auction mechanism based on resource similarity and the user cost-effectiveness value, which unifies the two stages of resource allocation and payment pricing, overcoming the problem of low revenue caused by overallocated resources and the lowest winning price. This mechanism can also achieve truthfulness, individual rationality and computational efficiency. In the experimental section, the proposed mechanism is compared with the optimal VCG mechanism and the monotonic mechanism with critical values in terms of revenue, social welfare, resource utilization, etc., and the results demonstrate the good effects of the mechanism designed in this article.