Truthful Multi Requirements Auction Mechanism for Virtual Resource Allocation of Cloud Computing

被引:6
|
作者
Zhang Jixian [1 ]
Xie Ning [1 ]
Li Weidong [2 ]
Yue Kun [1 ]
Zhang Xuejie [1 ]
机构
[1] Yunnan Univ, Sch Informat Sci & Engn, Kunming 650500, Yunnan, Peoples R China
[2] Yunnan Univ, Sch Resource Environm & Earth Sci, Kunming 650500, Yunnan, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Cloud computing; Virtual resource allocation; Multi-mind auction based mechanism; Social welfare; Truthful heuristic algorithm;
D O I
10.11999/JEIT170353
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
Auction based resource allocation is a major challenging problem for cloud computing. However, the existing research is based on untruthful, single resource, single requirement for the premise. In this paper, a truthful auction mechanism is designed for Virtual Resource Allocation and Payment (VRAP) in cloud computing. In this mechanism, users can submit multiple requests at one time, but only one request can be satisfied, known as multi requirements single mind. It is proved that the resource providers can obtain more social welfare under this mechanism than before, and it can guarantee the users' bids are truthful. The mechanism is still compatible with the traditional auction which the user can only submit one request. For the resource allocation problem, a heuristic algorithm is proposed to get the allocation result in a short time, through the reallocation strategy, the social welfare of the cloud resource provider can be maximized. The payment algorithm takes into account critical value to ensure that the machnism is truthful. In the experiment, it is analyzed in terms of social welfare, execution time, resource utilization and so on. Experimental results show that the proposed scheme has good effect for virtual resource action.
引用
收藏
页码:25 / 34
页数:10
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