Emission permit trading with a self-interested regulator

被引：0
|
作者：
Tapio Palokangas
机构：
[1] Helsinki GSE,
[2] University of Helsinki,undefined
来源：
Environmental Economics and Policy Studies | 2019年 / 21卷
关键词：
Emission caps; Emission permit trading; Command-and-control instruments; Common agency games; H23; F15; Q53;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
I examine the welfare effects of emission permit trading in an economy where the use of energy in production generates welfare-harming emissions, there is a regulator that sets industry-specific emission permits and the industries influence the regulator by paying political contributions. I show that policy with nontraded emission permits establishes aggregate production efficiency. Emission permit trading hampers efficiency and welfare by increasing the use of emitting inputs in dirty and decreasing that in clean industries.
引用
收藏
页码：413 / 426
页数：13
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