Social norms or social preferences?

被引：0
|
作者：
Binmore K. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Economics Department, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, Gower Street
来源：
Mind & Society | 2010年 / 9卷 / 2期
基金：
英国艺术与人文研究理事会; 英国经济与社会研究理事会;
关键词：
Behavioral economics; Evolutionary game theory; Inequity aversion; Social norm; Social preference; Ultimatum game;
D O I：
10.1007/s11299-010-0073-2
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Some behavioral economists argue that the honoring of social norms can be adequately modeled as the optimization of social utility functions in which the welfare of others appears as an explicit argument. This paper suggests that the large experimental claims made for social utility functions are premature at best, and that social norms are better studied as equilibrium selection devices that evolved for use in games that are seldom studied in economics laboratories. © 2010 Springer-Verlag.
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页码：139 / 157
页数：18
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