Public choice at the intersection of environmental law and economics

被引:1
|
作者
Yandle B. [1 ]
机构
[1] Department of Economics, Clemson University, Clemson
关键词
Environmental regulation; Law and economics; Political economy; Property rights; Public Choice;
D O I
10.1023/A:1008782132515
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Management of environmental assets begins with a commons and ends with various legal institutions that assign property rights and control. Each step in the evolution of these legal institutions involves collective decision making. Public Choice analysis helps to explain the decision making process and institutional characteristics that emerge. A survey of Public Choice literature that addresses environmental issues illustrates how Public Choice sheds light on outcomes for the U.S. experience. In the absence of Public Choice theory, law and economics scholars would be hard pressed to explain why costly forms of environmental regulation seem preferred to apparently more efficient institutions and why the body politic seemingly accepts a high-cost, low-output outcome. © 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
引用
收藏
页码:5 / 27
页数:22
相关论文
共 50 条