Social choice with infinite populations: construction of a rule and impossibility results

被引：0
|
作者：
Graciela Chichilnisky
Geoffrey Heal
机构：
[1] Department of Economics,
[2] Columbia University,undefined
[3] 405 Law Memorial Library,undefined
[4] New York,undefined
[5] NY 10027,undefined
[6] USA,undefined
[7] Program on Information and Resources,undefined
[8] Columbia University,undefined
[9] 405 Law Memorial Library,undefined
[10] New York,undefined
[11] NY 10027,undefined
[12] USA,undefined
来源：
Social Choice and Welfare | 1997年 / 14卷
关键词：
Social Choice; Individual Preference; Choice Rule; Simple Construction; Impossibility Result;
D O I：
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中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
 We provide a simple construction of social choice rules for economies with infinite populations. The rules are continuous, Pareto and non-dictatorial; they are constructed as limits of individual preferences when the limit exists, and otherwise as adequate generalizations. This contrasts with the impossibility results of Arrow (1951) and Chichilnisky (1980), which are valid on economies with finitely many individuals. Our social choice rules are, however, limits of dictatorial rules. This paper was written in 1979.
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页码：303 / 318
页数：15
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