Combinatorial auctions

被引：0
|
作者：
Jawad Abrache
Teodor Gabriel Crainic
Michel Gendreau
Monia Rekik
机构：
[1] Al Akhawayn University,School of Business Administration
[2] Université du Québec à Montréal,Chaire de recherche industrielle du CRSNG en management logistique, ESG
[3] Université de Montréal,Département d’informatique et de recherche opérationnelle
[4] Université de Montréal,Centre interuniversitaire de recherche sur les réseaux d’entreprise, la logistique et le transport (CIRRELT)
来源：
Annals of Operations Research | 2007年 / 153卷
关键词：
E-commerce; Mechanism design; Combinatorial auctions; Bidding languages; Iterative auctions; Advisors;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Combinatorial auctions are an important class of market mechanisms in which participants are allowed to bid on bundles of multiple heterogeneous items. In this paper, we discuss several complex issues that are encountered in the design of combinatorial auctions. These issues are related to the formulation of the winner determination problem, the expression of combined bids, the design of progressive combinatorial auctions that require less information revelation, and the need for decision support tools to help participants make profitable bidding decisions. For each issue, we survey the existing literature and propose avenues for further research.
引用
收藏
页码：131 / 164
页数：33
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [21] EQUILIBRIA OF GREEDY COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS
    Lucier, Brendan
    Borodin, Allan
    [J]. SIAM JOURNAL ON COMPUTING, 2017, 46 (02) : 620 - 660
  • [22] Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
    Holzman, R
    Kfir-Dahav, N
    Monderer, D
    Tennenholtz, M
    [J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2004, 47 (01) : 104 - 123
  • [23] Robot exploration with combinatorial auctions
    Berhault, M
    Huang, H
    Keskinocak, P
    Koenig, S
    Elmaghraby, W
    Griffin, P
    Kleywegt, A
    [J]. IROS 2003: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2003 IEEE/RSJ INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLIGENT ROBOTS AND SYSTEMS, VOLS 1-4, 2003, : 1957 - 1962
  • [24] Combinatorial advertising internet auctions
    Dimitri, Nicola
    [J]. ELECTRONIC COMMERCE RESEARCH AND APPLICATIONS, 2018, 32 : 49 - 56
  • [25] Some tractable combinatorial auctions
    Tennenholtz, M
    [J]. SEVENTEENTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AAAI-2001) / TWELFTH INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE (IAAI-2000), 2000, : 98 - 103
  • [26] Combinatorial Auctions Without Money
    Fotakis, Dimitris
    Krysta, Piotr
    Ventre, Carmine
    [J]. ALGORITHMICA, 2017, 77 (03) : 756 - 785
  • [27] Super solutions for combinatorial auctions
    Holland, A
    O'Sullivan, B
    [J]. RECENT ADVANCES IN CONSTRAINTS, 2005, 3419 : 187 - 200
  • [28] Exact methods for combinatorial auctions
    Goossens, Dries
    [J]. 4OR-A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 2007, 5 (04): : 335 - 338
  • [29] Iterative Dutch combinatorial auctions
    Shantanu Biswas
    Y. Narahari
    [J]. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 2005, 44 : 185 - 205
  • [30] Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
    Krysta, Piotr
    Ventre, Carmine
    [J]. THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE, 2015, 571 : 21 - 35
12345