Wisdom Beyond Rationality: A Reply to Ryan

被引:0
|
作者
Iskra Fileva
Jon Tresan
机构
[1] University of North Carolina,Charles Koch Fellow and Faculty Fellow of the Parr Center for Ethics
[2] Chapel Hill,Visiting Scholar
[3] University of North Carolina,undefined
来源
Acta Analytica | 2013年 / 28卷
关键词
Wisdom; Rationality; Judgment; Value conflicts; Virtue;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
We discuss Sharon Ryan’s Deep Rationality Theory of wisdom, defended recently in her “Wisdom, Knowledge and Rationality.” We argue that (a) Ryan’s use of the term “rationality” needs further elaboration; (b) there is a problem with requiring that the wise person possesses justified beliefs but not necessarily knowledge; (c) the conditions of DRT are not all necessary; (d) the conditions are not sufficient. At the end of our discussion, we suggest that there may be a problem with the very assumption that an informative, non-circular set of necessary and sufficient conditions of wisdom can be given.
引用
收藏
页码:229 / 235
页数:6
相关论文
共 50 条