The intuitiveness of the law of large numbers

In this paper two studies are reported in which two contrasting claims concerning the intuitiveness of the law of large numbers are investigated. While Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer (J Behav Decis Mak 10:33–51, 1997) claim that people have an intuition that conforms to the law of large numbers, but that they can only employ this intuition in specific circumstances, Kahneman and Tversky (Cogn Psychol 3:430–454, 1972) claim that people have an intuition that prohibits them from correctly applying the law of large numbers to certain tasks, making it necessary to reason analytically and inhibit the intuitive response. The dual processing theory of reasoning was used as the theoretical framework to study these two claims, while priming and a working memory load method were used to study the claims in more detail. No evidence was found for the claims of Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer (J Behav Decis Mak 10:33–51, 1997). Various possible explanations for the results are provided and options for further research are suggested. © 2015, FIZ Karlsruhe.