Research on environmental regulation behavior among local government, enterprises, and consumers from the perspective of dynamic cost of enterprises

Comprehensive behavioral research on environmental regulation is scarcer and critical in the presence of uncontrolled environmental degradation. Thus, this paper establishes a three-party evolution game from the perspective of enterprise’s dynamic cost, which is used to explore the environmental regulation behaviors among local government, enterprises, and consumers. Then we explain how the new model differs from the traditional model. Subsequently, the stability of equilibrium points is analyzed based on the Lyapunov stability theory. Taking snowflake brewery in China as a simulation case, the evolutionary behaviors are simulated and analyzed under different constraints. The results reveal that the local government plays an indispensable role in environmental regulation. Moreover, when the local government implements the environmental regulation policy with a certain probability, the behavioral strategy of game players in the dynamic system still cannot reach a stable state. Finally, we find that reasonable behavioral incentives for local governments help to build an effective mechanism that the ideal stable strategy can be achieved.