Power Indices and Minimal Winning Coalitions for Simple Games in Partition Function Form

被引：0

作者：

J. M. Alonso-Meijide

M. Álvarez-Mozos

M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro

机构：

[1] Universidade de Santiago de Compostela,Departamento de Estatística, Análise Matemática e Optimización, Facultade de Ciencias

[2] Universitat de Barcelona,Departament de Matemàtica Económica, Financera i Actuarial and Barcelona Economic Analysis Team, Facultat d’Economia i Empresa

[3] Universidade de Vigo,Departamento de Estatística e Investigación Operativa, Facultade de Ciencias Económicas e Empresariais

来源：

Group Decision and Negotiation | 2017年 / 26卷

关键词：

Deegan–Packel index; Public Good index; Simple games; Partition function form; Monotonicity;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

We propose a generalization of simple games to partition function form games based on a monotonicity property that we define in this context. This property allows us to properly speak about minimal winning embedded coalitions. We propose and characterize two power indices based on such coalitions. Finally, the new indices are used to study the distribution of power in the Parliament of Andalusia that emerged after the elections of March 22, 2015.

引用

页码：1231 / 1245

页数：14

共 47 条

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Alonso-Meijide, J. M.
Alvarez-Mozos, M.
Fiestras-Janeiro, M. G.
[J]. GROUP DECISION AND NEGOTIATION, 2017, 26 (06) : 1231 - 1245
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