Power indices and minimal winning coalitions

被引：12
|
作者：
Kirsch, Werner [2 ]
Langner, Jessica [1 ]
机构：
[1] Ruhr Univ Bochum, Fak Math, D-44780 Bochum, Germany
[2] FernUniv Hagen, Fak Math & Informat, D-58095 Hagen, Germany
来源：
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | 2010年 / 34卷 / 01期
关键词：
VOTING POWER;
D O I：
10.1007/s00355-009-0387-3
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The Penrose-Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index are the best-known and the most used tools to measure political power of voters in simple voting games. Most methods to calculate these power indices are based on counting winning coalitions, in particular those coalitions a voter is decisive for. We present a new combinatorial formula how to calculate both indices solely using the set of minimal winning coalitions.
引用
收藏
页码：33 / 46
页数：14
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