Evolutionary Stability of Polymorphic Profiles in Asymmetric Games

被引：1
|
作者：
Aradhana Narang
A. J. Shaiju
机构：
[1] Indian Institute of Technology Madras,Department of Mathematics
来源：
Dynamic Games and Applications | 2019年 / 9卷
关键词：
Asymmetric evolutionary games; Replicator dynamics; Games with continuous strategy space; Uninvadable profiles and sets; Lyapunov and asymptotic stability; 91A22; 91A10; 34A34; 34G20; 34D20; 34D05; 92D25;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Mendoza-Palacios and Hernández-Lerma (J Differ Equ 259(11):5709–5733, 2015) have introduced the concept of a strong uninvadable profile for asymmetric games with continuous pure strategy space and proved that such a profile is Lyapunov stable for the associated replicator dynamics when the profile is monomorphic. In the present paper, we establish that a polymorphic strong uninvadable profile is necessarily monomorphic. Further, it is shown that strong unbeatability is enough to guarantee Lyapunov stability of polymorphic profiles. A stability theorem for sets of polymorphic profiles is also presented and is illustrated using examples.
引用
收藏
页码：1126 / 1142
页数：16
相关论文
共 50 条
12345